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Background. We reflect on a methodology for de-
veloping scenario-based security behaviour surveys that
evolved through deployment in two large partner organ-
isations (A & B). In each organisation, scenarios are
grounded in workplace tensions between security and
employees’ productive tasks. These tensions are drawn
from prior interviews in the organisation, rather than us-
ing established but generic questionnaires. Survey re-
sponses allow clustering of participants according to pre-
defined groups.
Aim. We aim to establish the usefulness of framing sur-
vey questions around active security controls and prob-
lems experienced by employees, by assessing the validity
of the clustering. We introduce measures for the appro-
priateness of the survey scenarios for each organisation
and the quality of candidate answer options. We use
these scores to articulate the methodological improve-
ments between the two surveys.
Method. We develop a methodology to verify the
clustering of participants, where 516 (A) and 195 (B)
free-text responses are coded by two annotators. Inter-
annotator metrics are adopted to identify agreement. Fur-
ther, we analyse 5196 (A) and 1824 (B) appropriateness
and severity scores to measure the appropriateness and
quality of the questions.
Results. Participants rank questions in B as more appro-
priate than in A, although the variations in the severity
of the answer options available to participants is higher
in B than in A. We find that the scenarios presented in
B are more recognisable to the participants, suggesting
that the survey design has indeed improved. The anno-
tators mostly agree strongly on their codings with Krip-
pendorff’s α > 0.7. A number of clusterings should be
questioned, although α improves for reliable questionsby
0.15 from A to B.
Conclusions. To be able to draw valid conclusions from
survey responses, the train of analysis needs to be verifi-
able. Our approach allows us to further validate the clus-
tering of responses by utilising free-text responses. Fur-
ther, we establish the relevance and appropriateness of
the scenarios for individual organisations. While much
prior research draws on survey instruments from research
before it, this is then often applied in a different con-
text; in these cases adding metrics of appropriateness and
severity to the survey design can ensure that results relate
to the security experiences of employees.
1 Introduction
Engaging users is important to develop meaningful, ef-
fective security behaviour surveys. If studies are con-
ducted out of context, reproduction of results is difficult
[24]. Yet much of security awareness research examines
individuals’ abilities to internalise and enact knowledge
of security risks and controls in an abstract setting. Ef-
forts to measure security behaviour frequently assess in-
dividuals’ competency in general security skills (see Sec-
tion 2). Much of this research ignores the bounded effort
of the individual [6, 16], and that employees in organisa-
tions have other responsibilities [3].
Here we run a validation exercise on scenario-based
surveys conducted in two large organisations each with
many thousands of staff. Scenarios are built on frictions
between security and regular business tasks derived from
prior exploratory interviews with a cross-section of em-
ployees. The core principles of the methodology under-
lying the two surveys are: determining attitudes toward
security provisions and policy in the organisation, and;
characterising how individuals act independently or with
others to enact security-related behaviours. The differ-
ences between the surveys represent an evolution in sur-
vey design as lessons have been learned, where we de-
velop measures which account for these differences and
allow cross-comparison between survey deployments.
We describe the framework for our scenario-based sur-
veys in Section 3.
Here we explore the capacity to utilise additional types
of questions to reflect on the survey design without fur-
ther effort by the researchers. If the participants are given
an opportunity to indicate the applicability of the scenar-
ios to their environment, we can tailor the results not just
to specific user groups, but also reflect on how a survey
engages with diverse groups and their security needs.
From the analysis we formulate further metrics for
measuring how aligned the security apparatus of an or-
ganisation is with the employees who are governed by
the policies and controls that are in place. This is
achieved through Likert-scale questions added to the ex-
isting questionnaire, as described in our methodology
(Section 4), which serve as internal validity measures.
The surveys conducted with our two partner organisa-
tions contain questions structured in this way, and we dis-
cuss the results of our research in Section 5. We find that
the appropriateness and applicability of the questions of
the survey have improved from A to B. Similarly, the
reliability of the clustering of the answer options has im-
proved. Yet participants judge the answer options in B to
be more severe and less balanced than in A.
This immediately available feedback allows re-
searchers to continuously evaluate their survey design
and discard unreliable questions from further analysis.
In broader terms, we reflect on this approach in the dis-
cussion that follows in Section 6, and in the conclusions
in Section 7.
2 Related Work
We consider scenario-based security behaviour survey
research from two perspectives: Initially we examine the
construction and motivation of these surveys, and in the
second stage we focus on the reliability of survey analy-
sis (given that surveys would be deployed in specific or-
ganisational contexts). Our review of related work high-
lights the need to situate scenarios in the participants’
environment to build a reliable picture of how security
provisions and workplace conditions interact.
Most of the works reviewed do not evaluate the exter-
nal validity of the questionnaires applied but instead rely
on additional prior work. Our methodology brings ob-
vious benefits to survey designs in research and practice
alike.
Egelman et al. [14] developed the Security Behavior
Intentions Scale (SeBIS) to predict security behaviours
for common controls (‘awareness’, ‘passwords’, ‘updat-
ing’, and ‘securement’). The SeBIS survey comprises
of 16 items on a 5-point Likert scale. SeBIS was de-
ployed on several occasions through Mechanical Turk
(and in one case, PhoneLab). The goal of the work was
to determine if self-reported, intended, behaviours trans-
lated into actual behaviour. To this end, tasks were set
relating to each behaviour category (such as identifying
fake login pages). The authors accepted that the designed
tasks were targeted and narrow in scope, but with a focus
on exploring SeBIS’ predictive capabilities in this lim-
ited setting. Here we use scenarios and options based
in real organisational settings to establish an individual’s
behaviour type and attitude toward the security apparatus
around them; the focus is not on predicting behaviour,
but rather to capture a snapshot of how effectively secu-
rity provisions are perceived to be supporting the busi-
ness.
Parsons et al. [26] sought to validate a survey tool
for measuring information security awareness and aware-
ness initiatives, the Human Aspects of Information Se-
curity Questionnaire (HAIS-Q).Two studies were con-
ducted: in one study, participants completed the HAIS-Q
and were tested for security skills (in this case, identi-
fying potential phishing links amongst a range of fabri-
cated emails); in the second study, engagement of par-
ticipants in the survey was examined by establishing the
level of non-responsivity. Here, we similarly seek to de-
termine whether the scenarios and response options in
our surveys resonated with participants, through exami-
nation of internal measures within our situated surveys.
By doing so we identify repeatable measures for measur-
ing engagement.
Rajivan et al. [27] propose a questionnaire for captur-
ing users’ level of security expertise, presented as being
a critical factor in how well an individual can assess risk
and use available security controls. The questionnaire
seeks to separate respondents across the dimensions of
skills, rules, and knowledge, toward understanding how
individuals apply these in different situations. Here we
discuss our survey methodology as a means to not only
determine how employees use the tools available to them
as individuals and groups, but also how they respond to
specific risks which can potentially arise in their working
environment. Rajivan et al. also included free-text ques-
tions to capture additional comments from participants,
where we use a similar internal mechanism in our sit-
uated scenarios so that participants can further describe
security experiences from their own perspective (further
informing the picture of security on the ground).
Karlsson et al. [20] posit that in organisations, infor-
mation security compliance must be evaluated relative to
employees’ work tasks (and with this, competing goals
and their related values such as productivity and effi-
ciency). The authors speak of there being “tensions and
dilemmas” where one option is preferable to others that
are available. While the argument is made that situational
context is critical to understanding how tensions are re-
solved, the authors’ questionnaire however is free from
any contextual settings. This does allow it to be applied
to any “white-collar individual”, but may limit how the
questionnaire captures the “tensions and dilemmas” that
exist in a specific organisation. Here we are assessing
scenarios which are grounded in prior interviews with
employees, specifically to identify those regular tensions
and dilemmas which occur in the workplace.
We argue that surveys that are situated in scenarios
that the participants can relate to will engage them and
evoke genuine responses, which can inform efforts to im-
prove the effectiveness of security solutions in an organ-
isation. Some research has focused on basing scenario
design in literature, where Blythe [9] argues that scenar-
ios should “[avoid] unusual events and characters but
nonetheless resonate with the respondent in a way that
they are readily understood while presenting multiple so-
lutions.” Siponen and Vance argue that research needs to
be practically relevant by ensuring contextual relevance
[29]. Their five suggestions focus on studying informa-
tion system policy violations, but are equally transferable
to other behavioural research (and related to the princi-
ples derived by Krol et al. in [23] for studying usability
in security and privacy). Many examples of security be-
haviour research using questionnaire instruments do not
consider the role of task conflicts characterised by Karls-
son et al. [20]. These works instead draw on existing
questions from prior research [13, 19, 30, 31, 33]. The
importance of scenario-based surveys is underlined by
Wash et al.’s findings that individuals do not self-report
security accurately [32]: it undermines much of the tradi-
tional self-reported constructs used for inferring personal
security behaviour.
Sohrabi et al. for example argue that “the lack of infor-
mation security awareness, ignorance, negligence, apa-
thy, mischief, and resistance are the root of users’ mis-
takes” [30]. Their questionnaire uses nine information
security constructs from prior literature to model their
interactions. These questions and mappings are adopted
from four previous studies [13, 19, 31, 33]. However
each of these articles in turn is standing on the shoulders
of giants, citing a total of 29 prior works to support their
survey design, which, in turn, cite over 100 other unique
articles to support the quality of their survey design. The
sources span the fields of sociology, education, criminol-
ogy, information systems and medical research.
Of the literature referenced by Sohrabi et al. and their
references in turn, the vast majority source their con-
structs and survey questions from further literature. A
number of articles construct their own questions. The
most rigorous of those papers in the chain to do any pre-
testing validation of their question design is by Bulgurcu
et al. [11], who conduct two rounds of card sorting by 11
students followed by two rounds of pilot testing by 110
individuals. Huang [17] and Chang and Chuang [12] also
conduct some limited pre-testing.
While it is good scientific practice to rely on constructs
that have been rigorously tested in prior works, only one
of the papers ([19]) discussed above cites the primary
literature which validates the constructs in their original
setting ([11]). Further, as throughout the literature, the
questions are taken out of context of their original re-
search premise, where the validity of the original vali-
dation should be revisited in each new context. It is un-
derstandable that a full pre-study is infeasible for every
new questionnaire, yet augmenting the survey with addi-
tional questions (as described subsequently) to support
the measurement of validity post-hoc would be cheap
and desirable.
The data of our research is grounded in competing
goals in realistic scenarios, so that (i) security managers
can better understand how employees’ attitude and be-
haviour toward security policy and controls influence the
approach to problem resolution, and (ii) researchers can
gain further insight into the shape of tensions between se-
curity and productive tasks in an organisational setting.
3 Background
In this section we describe the two surveys that con-
tribute the primary data in this paper.
The first organisation to be studied we shall call
Company A1 (which has many thousands of employ-
ees). In this organisation 118 semi-structured interviews
were conducted, exploring conflicts between security
and business processes lasting on average 40 minutes.
These interviews were analysed with thematic analysis,
and form the basis of workplace-based scenarios and
possible solutions informed by approaches reported by
employees. Scenarios are combined to create a scenario-
based survey. A similar approach is described by Blythe
et al. [10] for conducting interviews around security be-
haviours within organisations, presenting dilemmas as
short stories with a central character in a specific context
(and informed by an organisation’s security policies). A
small proportion of Company A’s workforce was sam-
pled through interviews, where a wider survey would
attempt to capture the prevalence of the issues identi-
fied in interviews across the wider company. A total of
1486 participants provided complete responses. Further,
the respondents gave 516 additional comments at various
stages of the survey, through text-entry fields provided.
A second, similarly large organisation (which we call
Company B) was studied subsequently, where lessons
learned from the analysis of Company A improved the
organisation of the survey process. These lessons have
caused the progression in groupings as described in Ta-
ble 1 and discussed in Section 4. The initial attitude
and behaviour types [4] were derived from Adams [1].
1for brevity the companies will be referred to as ‘A’ and ‘B’ for the
remainder of this paper
85 interviews were conducted in Company B of similar
lengths to the interviews in A, where again these were
used in a similar methodology as in A to develop a larger-
scale survey. A survey was conducted using scenarios
built upon themes emerging from the qualitative analy-
sis of the interviews. 641 employees responded to this
survey, including 195 free text responses. While the sur-
vey results have been analysed [4, 7] here we explore
how the free-text responses can indicate the success of
the survey in engaging with the organisation’s employ-
ees. Further analysis of the interviews that informed the
survey designs can be found in [22] for Company A, [21]
for Company B, and [8] for a combination of both organ-
isations.
3.1 Employee types
In each of the two surveys we attempt to position par-
ticipating employees on two dimensions. In A these are
Attitude and Behaviour types, whereas in B these have
evolved to Maturity levels and Behaviour types. For the
definitions of the types please see Table 1. Foremost,
these two dimensions can be examined individually and
in combination – across age groups, business divisions,
and physical locations – to target interventions which re-
duce friction between security and productivity in the
workplace.
The attitude types in A focus on individuals’ interac-
tion with security apparatus. In B, these have evolved
to a scale of Maturity Levels, which are ranked levels
of individuals’ interaction with the organisation’s policy
(such that interventions would act to improve employ-
ees’ working interactions with centralised security pol-
icy and security provisions). In both A and B, the partic-
ipants were also asked to assign an appropriateness score
for each answer option on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging
from not acceptable at all to very acceptable.
The behaviour types in A are a measure of the indi-
viduals’ likelihood to trade-off security for productivity.
This evolved to the more abstract concepts in B where
the answers are now mapped to four distinct behaviour
types as defined by Adams [1], to better represent the
role of teams and organisational culture in individual se-
curity behaviours. Additionally, participants were asked
to assign a severity score to each answer option of the
behaviour type questions, as well as give a general in-
dicator as to how acceptable to the business it would be
for the participant not to finish the task described in each
scenario.
3.2 Survey design
Figure 1 shows one of the scenarios in B (note
that participants did not see the Individual-
(a) Attitude Types for A
1 Discount suspicions, cause no bother, pas-
sive,
2 Report suspicions but take no direct action,
3 Take direct action through official channels,
4 Take direct personal action against the
threat.
(b) Behaviour Types for A
1 Prepared to perform insecure acts to max-
imise productivity,
2 Show a minor priority for work over security
when the two conflict,
3 Passive, expects others to take the initiative
to ensure security,
4 Tries to remain secure wherever possible.
(c) Maturity Levels for B
1 Is not engaged with security in any capacity,
2 Follows security policy only when forced to
do so by external controls,
3 Understands that a policy exists and follows
it by rote,
4 Has internalised the intent of the policy and
adopts good security practises even when
not specifically required to,
5 Champions security to others and challenges
breaches in their environment.
(d) Behaviour Types for B
Individualists rely on themselves for solu-
tions to problems,
Egalitarians rely on social or group solutions
to problems,
Hierarchists rely on existing systems or tech-
nologies for solutions to problems,
Fatalists take a ‘naive’ approach to solving
problems, feeling that their actions are not
significant in creating outcomes.
Table 1: The dimensions by which survey responses are
measured in Company A and Company B
Question: File Storage (Behaviour-type)
Concerned about the safety of his current work,
Shamal decides to back up his data, some of
which is confidential. As he uses his own lap-
top under the ‘bring your own device’ scheme, he
usually stores all his work on his drive on the cen-
tral server but he wants to have a second copy just
in case something happens or he loses connectiv-
ity to the company network. He thought about
using one of the common drives but none of the
ones he regularly uses have sufficient space.
Individualist: Create a local copy on the hard
drive of your BYOD laptop, it is the only
machine you work on so you know it will be
safe and this ensures you will always have
access to it if needed.
Egalitarian: Use a common drive that you used
for an old project and still have access to,
as your credentials were never revoked. It
has enough space although you do not know
who manages it now.
Hierarchist: Use an online service, such as Drop-
box, to store the data as it is more under
your control.
Fatalist: Back your work up onto a USB stick
– you have ordered an encrypted one but
while you wait for it to arrive you use a per-
sonal stick you have to hand.
Figure 1: Scenario ‘File Storage’ (QFS) in B
ist/Egalitarian/Hierarchist/Fatalist labels, as defined
in Table 1). In each organisation, surveys were crafted
for participants based upon their department to improve
relevance, see [4, 7] for more details. For the example
scenario in Table 1, we found through the interviews that
data availability was a predominant issue in the organisa-
tions, where many interview participants mentioned the
use of security workarounds [5] to guarantee that they
reached their business goals. Question design attempted
to offer the participants a number of options which
would all be regarded as equally appropriate, based upon
the themes identified from the preceding interviews with
employees. The participants were asked to rank the
four options in order of their preferences. Additionally,
participants were allowed to offer additional comments,
which included the following example:
“Shamal needs to find out who manages the
common drive now, and whether the company
authorises use of Dropbox and personal USB
sticks, before using any of those options.”
As part of the work described here, two annotators
coded the volunteered comments for the types (without
reference to the alignment of responses to types already
defined for each question). For example, the quotation
above could be coded as a Hierarchist’s point of view, as
the individual falls back to existing structures for solu-
tions to the problem.
“This scenario could easily be avoided by pro-
viding sufficient space on the common drives.”
Conversely, this statement has been coded as a Fatalist.
The employee is frustrated that the natural solution to the
problem is outside their reach.
4 Methodology
The methodology laid out in this section establishes three
metrics to measure the quality of the survey design and
its external validity retrospectively. The quality of the
survey includes how engaged participants are in consid-
ering a scenario, and how relevant a scenario and its op-
tions are to their own experiences. If an organisation
is committed to measuring how well its security provi-
sions support the effective completion of business tasks
towards identifying and removing frictions, decision-
makers would have a natural interest in having a realistic
picture of the current experiences of employees.
4.1 Appropriateness and applicability
For each of the answer options to Attitude and Maturity
questions (see Tables 1a and 1c) participants were asked
to specify the acceptability of that answer on a 5-point
Likert scale ranging from “Not acceptable at all” to “Very
acceptable”. There are of course biases present here,
namely that given a participant’s type they may see some
options as more acceptable than others. Indeed there is a
statistically significant (at p < 0.001) correlation in our
survey response data between the ranking of options and
their associated behaviour types with Kendall’s τ of 0.62.
Yet the ideal scenario design would leave the participants
with four objectively equally acceptable options, and al-
low the participant to freely rank the option.Hence a high
appropriateness score is desired.
Similarly, for each of the answer options to Behaviour
type questions (see Tables 1b and 1d) participants were
asked to specify the severity of each option as well as the
acceptability of failing to complete the task for each sce-
nario on a 5-point Likert scale. Again, the severity scores
are statistically significantly (at p < 0.001) correlated
with the ranking of the answers (Kendall’s τ = −0.20),
with less severe answers being ranked as more prefer-
able. The severity scores of the different answers should
be ranked equally by the participants (as questions are
designed with no one ‘right’ answer), resulting in a low
standard deviation throughout the questions. The ideal
mean of the standard deviation of severity of options is
0, which would imply that all options given to the partic-
ipants are perceived as equally severe.
The acceptability of failing to complete the task metric
would ideally be identically distributed for all questions
in order to allow for inter-question comparison. This is
a metric that is difficult to establish through prior anal-
ysis. If participants think that for a scenario it is more
acceptable for it not to be completed given the given con-
sequences as in the scenario and its options, the partici-
pants do not fully commit to their choices of behaviour
types, as in no scenario there is an option to do nothing
(and in turn avoid side effects from the chosen solution).
4.2 Validation of ranked types by free-text
responses
In the survey design for both A and B, participants are
asked to rank four answer options according to their pref-
erences. Participants are also invited to provide addi-
tional comments on the questions. We find that there
are two common types of responses: those that further
confirm a respondent’s answer, or elicit suggestions / so-
lutions that are not included in the question and the asso-
ciated options. We code these according to the applicable
mapping (Attitude or Behaviour) in each organisation as
listed in Table 1, e.g., for each free text response the an-
notators have to choose from one of four options. While
this is opportunistic (not all participants provided addi-
tional comments), we can validate the mappings by cal-
culating inter-annotator agreement metrics as described
in the following sections.
4.2.1 Inter-annotator agreement
Coder A
Coder B T1 T2 T3 T4
T1 4 3 0 0
T2 0 36 2 15
T3 0 2 59 1
T4 0 0 1 32
Table 2: Confusion matrix for Question 1 in A between
the coders’ assignment of types to the free text responses
The calculation of the inter-annotator agreement be-
tween the two coders is straightforward. We first cal-
culate a confusion matrix for each question (an exam-
ple is shown in Table 2), and then calculate Krippen-
dorff’s chance corrected inter-annotator agreement met-
ric α . Krippendorff’s α ranges from −1 to +1, where
0 corresponds to chance agreement and +1 to perfect
agreement. As the attitude types and maturity levels in
Tables 1a and 1c are on a ranked scale, we weight the
disagreement linearly. For the other two types described
in Tables 1b and 1d the agreement is binary.
4.2.2 Validating the mapping
Coding type
Rank T1 T2 T3 T4
1 2 6 84 3
2 5 26 22 10
3 2 19 12 34
4 2 43 6 34
Table 3: Confusion matrix for Question 1 in A between
participants assigned ranks to the potential answers and
the types assigned to the participants by the coders based
on the coding of the free text responses
We validate the mapping of the survey answer options
(an example is shown in Figure 1) by treating the par-
ticipants as another annotator and calculating the inter-
annotator metric α . However, the participants rank their
options, but the coders annotate separate (but not inde-
pendent) text statements. For example, a participant may
provide a ranking of Type 3 > Type 2 > Type 4 > Type
1 for a specific question, and from the coders we may see
Coder X: Type 3, Coder Y: Type 2.
In this case the standard agreement table approach [15]
for > 2 annotators cannot be used. Yet Krippendorff’s α
naturally extends to non-square weight matrices. In our
case, this leads to a confusion matrix such as in Table 3.
Here we tabulate the frequency that a coder has annotated
a statement with a specific type with the rank that the par-
ticipant gave that type. Perfect validation would there-
fore imply that all types chosen by the coders have rank
4; i.e. the only non-zero entries are in the bottom row
of the confusion matrix. Given this matrix we can exe-
cute the calculation of Krippendorff’s α with a weights
matrix that treats numbers in the bottom row as perfect
agreement, and linearly increases disagreement for lower
ranked options.
4.2.3 Estimating confidence in α
In order to calculate the confidence in the calculated
value of α we rely on α’s standard deviation. As an an-
alytic expression is not available, we bootstrap the cal-
culation of α . In the following sections the confidence
intervals are calculated using 1000-fold bootstrapping.
5 Results
In this section we present the application of the metrics
defined in Section 4 to the datasets described in Sec-
tion 3. There are four tables to consider in this section;
Tables 4 and 5 for the analysis of the secondary coding of
the free text responses, Table 6 for the analysis of appro-
priateness scores on attitude/maturity questions, and Ta-
ble 7 for the analysis of the severity metrics on behaviour
type questions.
5.1 Analysis of clustering
Table 3 is an example confusion matrix calculated based
on the methodology presented in Section 4.2.2. The col-
umn headers list the four possible types assigned to the
free-text responses by the coders. If a free-text response
by the coders was judged to be type 1, but the partici-
pant ranked the answer corresponding to type 1 as rank
2, this would increment the number in row 1, column 2.
Perfect agreement would be represented by the type as-
signed through coding of the free-text responses always
being ranked highest (rank 4) by the participants. This
would be a confusion matrix of non-zero entries in the
bottom row only.
The strong disagreement between the coders and the
assigned rank in question 1 can be identified by the
strong mismatch in type 3: of the 124 statements as-
signed to type 3 by the coders, 84 were ranked least likely
(rank 1) by the participants. This implies that the answer
option assigned to type 3 “Request that those with access
share their (main log-in) account details and passwords
with those without to allow them access to the informa-
tion”) does not match behaviour type 3 (as defined in
Table 1) (“Passive, expects others to take the initiative to
ensure security”).
Interestingly, this disagreement is not reflected in the
coding of the free-text responses themselves. Table 2
shows the confusion matrix for Question 1 for the two
coders. There is virtually no disagreement for types 1, 2
and 3; but some disagreement for type 4, where 15 state-
ments assigned to type 4 by coder A were considered to
be type 2 by coder B. The internal validity for the coding
of free text responses for Question 1a can be accepted
based on Krippendorff’s α of 0.77± 0.00 as shown in
Table 4, but we are unable to validate the mapping of
answer options to types.
Tables 4 and 5 list the number of free-text responses
coded and Krippendorff’s α for both the validation of
the mapping as well as the coders agreement.
Question # Mapping α Coder’s α
Q4 40 0.21±0.02 0.29±0.02
Q5 34 0.35±0.02 0.02±0.03
Q6 2 −0.33±0.76 0.00±0.67
Q8 29 0.30±0.04 0.94±0.02
Q10 37 0.23±0.03 0.73±0.02
Q1 155 −0.03±0.01 0.77±0.00
Q2 137 0.43±0.01 0.91±0.00
Q3 12 0.33±0.08 0.38±0.10
Q7 25 0.24±0.03 0.13±0.04
Q9 45 0.13±0.02 0.76±0.02
Table 4: Krippendorff’s α measures for compA with
95% confidence intervals.
Question # Mapping α Coder’s α
QID 33 0.27±0.02 0.85±0.02
QCDP 53 0.31±0.01 0.38±0.02
QT 22 0.24±0.04 0.34±0.05
QSD 27 0.53±0.02 0.47±0.04
QRM 12 0.27±0.07 0.42±0.07
QVPN 23 −0.09±0.03 0.37±0.04
QFS 18 0.19±0.05 0.46±0.05
QCC 7 0.38±0.13 0.75±0.21
Table 5: Krippendorff’s α measures for compB with
95% confidence intervals.
5.1.1 Suitable values for α
Before discussing this data further we must delineate the
boundaries for which we consider Krippendorff’s α to be
reliable. From a statistical perspective we can conduct a
t-test where the null hypothesis is α = 0, i.e. the data
is equivalent to chance. This t-test is represented in our
tables through the use of 95% confidence intervals. In-
deed all rows that are statistically significant at the 95%
confidence interval are also significant at the 99% confi-
dence interval. However the literature [15] is clear that
primary data is only sufficiently reliable for further anal-
ysis at α > 0.667.
It is clear that most of the coder’s agreement values
in A satisfy this criteria. There are a number of ex-
ceptions: Q5, Q3 and Q7. The inter-coder agreement
is not as strong in B, where only QID satisfies this cri-
teria. When focusing on the validation of the map-
ping/clustering however, none of the scenarios satisfies
this stringent criteria.
Considering the difficulty the coders have to establish
agreement on the free-text responses in B, the low map-
ping α values are not surprising: the coding is a difficult
task (given the brevity of comments and potential lack of
contextual information). Yet rather than discarding the
results at this stage, it may be more important to identify
the scenarios which are indistinguishable from random
data: scenarios Q1 in A and QVPN in B. Apart from
these two scenarios, our data allows the focus of further




Question # mean std mean std
Company A
Q4 374 0.626 0.120 0.923 0.195
Q5 820 0.570 0.110 0.925 0.161
Q6 137 0.427 0.138 0.821 0.321
Q8 364 0.529 0.085 0.983 0.084
Q10 903 0.483 0.082 0.917 0.185
Company B
QID 152 0.488 0.122 0.778 0.316
QCDP 456 0.508 0.108 0.893 0.220
QT 164 0.499 0.095 0.873 0.252
QSD 292 0.546 0.118 0.939 0.181
Table 6: Appropriateness scores for each attitude ques-
tion in compA, the higher, the more appropriate. As each
answer option is assigned an appropriateness score, the
mean represents the mean appropriateness score of all
answer options irrespective of that answer’s ranking. The
1st choice only considers the appropriateness assigned
by the participants to their top choice.
Table 6 shows the appropriateness scores the partic-
ipants have given the answer options for specific ques-
tions. The scores vary from 0 (not appropriate) to 1 (very
appropriate). The mean appropriateness score is more
varied in A than in B, although it is close to 0.5 for all
questions, indicating that the average answer option is
balanced. This is desirable as it offers participants the
option to swing to both extremes as necessary. The ap-
propriateness score given by participants to their highest
ranked choice is very high, confirming the participant’s
stance that they view their preferred choice as most ap-
propriate.
5.3 Severity
Table 7 compares the distribution of severity scores and
acceptability of failing the task scores across the differ-
ent scenarios and organisations. There are a number of
variations: Scenarios in A are considered less acceptable
Failing Std of Severity
Question # mean std mean std
Company A
Q1 903 0.281 0.307 0.270 0.128
Q2 893 0.270 0.296 0.239 0.123
Q3 137 0.394 0.340 0.271 0.122
Q7 291 0.458 0.393 0.296 0.144
Q9 374 0.668 0.449 0.274 0.123
Company B
QRM 152 0.196 0.312 0.377 0.101
QVPN 152 0.439 0.370 0.323 0.120
QFS 164 0.430 0.318 0.297 0.114
QCC 292 0.240 0.410 0.182 0.163
Table 7: Acceptability of failing to complete the task
(higher more acceptable) and standard deviation of sever-
ity of options for behaviour type scenarios in compA.
to be left undone, however the standard variations of the
severity scores across the different scenario options are
higher. According to Table 7 the scenarios in B are there-
fore believed by the participants to be more applicable to
their environment (particularly QRM and QCC), but the
answer options are more balanced in severity in A, im-
plying that options represent potential solutions that may
be seen in everyday work in A compared to the more
contrived answer options in B.
6 Discussion
This research supports a process of continuous improve-
ment to organisational security, by providing measures
for (i) typical workaround to regular frictions with se-
curity in the workplace (by analysing the perceived suit-
ability of solutions derived from interviews), and (ii) how
the interactions employees have with security apparatus
can be designed to minimise the demand on their ‘com-
pliance budget’ [6]. Employee’s willingness to expend
effort for the security of not only themselves but those
around them can be explored by articulating embodied
security cultures which may arise in any number of situa-
tions in the workplace where security controls can be ap-
plied. Both the survey results and the free-text responses
can inform targeted interventions as part of incremen-
tal improvement, an approach advocated by Renaud and
Goucher [28]. Unfortunately in striving for internal va-
lidity for security behaviour constructs it is easy to over-
look the need to establish the applicability of the results
to the real world, that is, to measure the quality of en-
gagement with employees (where tensions can arise with
local demands on effort and capacity). The related works
discussed in Section 2 demonstrate this well.
Security managers ought to identify the non-divisible
security behaviours in their own organisations, and
equally deploy information security surveys that shine
light on previously unseen workaround or compromise
behaviours by engaging employees. To do this, avail-
able options (and ideally, additional feedback from users)
must point to clear responses to security-related chal-
lenges that employees see as acceptable given the pres-
sures they perceive in a particular situation. Where re-
spondents imply confusion about what is being asked of
them in a scenario-based survey question – or indeed,
see two or more behaviours as one and the same – this
implies that more can be done to clearly separate candi-
date behaviours. In turn, this can be achieved if secu-
rity managers act to grow their understanding of how se-
curity manifests for employees who have other compet-
ing demands for their attention (see also Ashenden and
Lawrence [2], Herley [16] and Parkin et al. [25]).
Our proposed survey methodology and validity mea-
sures address these challenges. This is achieved both in-
ternally (by way of inter-annotator agreement), and ex-
ternally (by way of appropriateness and severity scores).
We are able to highlight strengths and shortcomings in
the survey design which not only inform the design of
realistic scenarios by researchers, but also inform the in-
vestment in security by policy managers when designing
interventions. Organisational environments are complex,
and researchers cannot assume that they have a full un-
derstanding of security behaviours prior to deploying a
survey. This research helps to identify these known un-
knowns. Security practitioners considering potential in-
vestments may do well to understand the quality of the
data they base their decisions upon [18].
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have described a methodology for post-
hoc assessment of the quality of situated security be-
haviour survey designs. We utilise free-text responses
and reflective metrics to measure the surveys’ external
validity. We have demonstrated this approach on two
surveys in two large organisations, drawing on 711 free
text responses and over 7000 reflective scores in the pro-
cess. This has allowed us to quantify the evolution of our
scenario-based surveys through clearly-defined and re-
peatable metrics, and partially validate the mapping from
survey responses to constructs. This knowledge will al-
low security managers to tailor future improvements to
their organisation’s security policy and behavioural inter-
ventions more accurately to the local working environ-
ment, relative to the demonstrable strengths and weak-
nesses of the survey design.
We strongly advice researchers designing surveys in
future to include open questions that can be answered by
the participant without being biased. Survey designers
should not assume they know everything about the re-
sponders even if the survey is grounded in qualitative re-
search, and continually look for ways to involve respon-
dents to gather more context-specific information, such
as by including the reflective questions described in this
research.
Dataset
The participant’s assigned categories and the two sets of
coding for both organisations as well as the analysis code
can be found at DOI 10.14324/000.ds.10038283.
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